Articles and essays organized by topic. Pieces first published elsewhere are credited at the top of each article.
Cyber Risk & Governance
Corporate and organizational cyber risk: governance, leadership ownership, norms, and the business side of security.
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Hacking Back – The Impact on Norms
Some commentators argue that companies should be allowed to strike back at hackers. This piece argues that the line between state and private action in cyberspace must hold, because it shapes how states deal with each other.
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NATO: The Growing Alliance and the Insider Risks
Insider threat is no longer only spies and sabotage. Any misalignment with the mission undermines it, and a growing alliance must plan for the half-hearted within.
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Business leaders need to own cyber security
Corporate cybersecurity can’t be left to consultants and IT staff. A business leader has to own the decisions, make their intent visible, and lead security work the same way they lead the business.
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Inflation – the hidden cyber security threat
Hackers are the visible threat; inflation is the quiet one. By eroding budgets and pay, it drives resignations and puts ongoing cyber work at risk unless leaders act early.
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European Open Data can be Weaponized
Open government data released for transparency can be combined into a detailed targeting picture. Innocent datasets, aggregated, become intelligence for an adversary.
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The War Game Revival
War games are back, and they are a low-cost way to test assumptions. But a poorly designed game can harden confirmation bias instead of exposing it.
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The long-term cost of cyber overreaction
Every reaction to a cyberattack shows the attacker something about your capabilities and thresholds. Overreacting gives away the uncertainty that is a defender’s real strength.
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For ethical artificial intelligence, security is pivotal
Ethical principles for AI mean little if the system can be compromised. A manipulated AI feeds spurious information to decision-makers, so security has to come first.
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Private Hackbacks can be Blowbacks
Letting companies strike back at hackers rests on five shaky assumptions, from accurate attribution to no foreign assets at risk. If they fail, private hackbacks become a government problem.
Critical Infrastructure & Resilience
Attacks on critical infrastructure, their cascading effects, and how societies and organizations build resilience.
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Cyber Attacks’ Main Ability to Destabilize a Society is through Secondary Effects
The cyber debate fixates on the systems themselves. A society’s real exposure lies in the secondary and tertiary effects: a hacked control system at a water reservoir matters because of the flood it can cause downstream.
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After the War in Ukraine: Cyber Revanchism
When the war ends, Russia may strike back in cyberspace through criminal proxies, a face-saving way to get the last word. Western infrastructure should prepare for the cyber fallout.
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Demilitarize civilian cyber defense
Using military cyber units to chase ransomware gangs and defend civilian targets is unsustainable. A civilian federal response capability would strengthen both defense and deterrence.
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Our Critical Infrastructure – Their Cyber Range
Not every attack on US critical infrastructure serves a grand strategy. Hostile regimes may simply be using American systems as a training range for their operators, and that changes how defenders should read the threat.
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What COVID-19 can teach us about cyber resilience
The pandemic showed how a society reacts to a sudden, invisible threat, and what that tells us about resilience to a major cyberattack. Written with Col. Stephen Hamilton.
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How the Founding Fathers helped make the US cyber-resilient
A stable society can absorb attacks without falling into chaos. That stability, built over centuries, is a stronger defense against strategic cyberwar than any single technology.
Cyber Strategy & Deterrence
Cyber deterrence, offensive and defensive cyber operations, and strategic surprise.
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Cyber Warfare: Don’t Show Your Cards
In cyber conflict, uncertainty is leverage. Building on Kenneth Waltz’s insight about nuclear weapons, this piece argues that a state gains more from doubt about its cyber capabilities than from revealing their limits.
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Cyber Attacks’ Main Ability to Destabilize a Society is through Secondary Effects
The cyber debate fixates on the systems themselves. A society’s real exposure lies in the secondary and tertiary effects: a hacked control system at a water reservoir matters because of the flood it can cause downstream.
-
The Weaponized Mind
We treat technology and information as the weapons and overlook the few people with outsized operational impact. In cyber, the decisive asset is the rare talent who knows how to combine freely available tools.
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Hacking Back – The Impact on Norms
Some commentators argue that companies should be allowed to strike back at hackers. This piece argues that the line between state and private action in cyberspace must hold, because it shapes how states deal with each other.
-
Designer Satellite Collisions from Covert Cyber War
A hijacked satellite could be steered into a collision that looks like an accident. This 2012 paper examines covert cyber attacks on space assets and why active defense is needed.
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Demilitarize civilian cyber defense
Using military cyber units to chase ransomware gangs and defend civilian targets is unsustainable. A civilian federal response capability would strengthen both defense and deterrence.
-
The War Game Revival
War games are back, and they are a low-cost way to test assumptions. But a poorly designed game can harden confirmation bias instead of exposing it.
-
The long-term cost of cyber overreaction
Every reaction to a cyberattack shows the attacker something about your capabilities and thresholds. Overreacting gives away the uncertainty that is a defender’s real strength.
-
Solorigate attack — the challenge to cyber deterrence
The SolarWinds compromise was more than a national security breach. It called the concept of cyber deterrence itself into question, and exposed a gap between deterrence theory and what adversaries actually do.
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Government cyber breach shows need for convergence
The SolarWinds breach shows why cyber leaders need experience on both offense and defense. Written with MAJ Chuck Suslowicz and LTC Todd Arnold.
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Why Iran would avoid a major cyberwar
An authoritarian regime that survives by suppressing its people has the most to lose from strategic cyberwar. Iran would risk more than it could gain.
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How the Founding Fathers helped make the US cyber-resilient
A stable society can absorb attacks without falling into chaos. That stability, built over centuries, is a stronger defense against strategic cyberwar than any single technology.
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At Machine Speed in Cyber – Leadership Actions Close to Nullified
When attacks unfold at machine speed, leaders have no time to lead during the event. The decisions that matter are the ones made in advance, through pre-authorization.
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Private Hackbacks can be Blowbacks
Letting companies strike back at hackers rests on five shaky assumptions, from accurate attribution to no foreign assets at risk. If they fail, private hackbacks become a government problem.
AI & Security
Artificial intelligence as a security risk and a security tool: AI governance, the data AI depends on, trust, and decisions at machine speed.
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Artificial Intelligence (AI): The risk of over-reliance on quantifiable data
AI depends on what can be measured. History shows how decisions built only on quantifiable data miss what matters most, and why the data fed to AI is its weakest link.
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For ethical artificial intelligence, security is pivotal
Ethical principles for AI mean little if the system can be compromised. A manipulated AI feeds spurious information to decision-makers, so security has to come first.
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At Machine Speed in Cyber – Leadership Actions Close to Nullified
When attacks unfold at machine speed, leaders have no time to lead during the event. The decisions that matter are the ones made in advance, through pre-authorization.
Cyber Workforce & Talent
Recruiting, retaining and valuing the people who make cyber capability possible.
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The Weaponized Mind
We treat technology and information as the weapons and overlook the few people with outsized operational impact. In cyber, the decisive asset is the rare talent who knows how to combine freely available tools.
-
Inflation – the hidden cyber security threat
Hackers are the visible threat; inflation is the quiet one. By eroding budgets and pay, it drives resignations and puts ongoing cyber work at risk unless leaders act early.
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Government cyber breach shows need for convergence
The SolarWinds breach shows why cyber leaders need experience on both offense and defense. Written with MAJ Chuck Suslowicz and LTC Todd Arnold.
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Retention is Key for Cyber Talent Management
Recruiting and training cyber talent only pays off if the people stay. Retention, not recruitment, decides whether a cyber organization can grow.
Geopolitical Risk
China, Russia, Iran and the contest with the West, and what it means for cyber and infrastructure risk.
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Cyber Warfare: Don’t Show Your Cards
In cyber conflict, uncertainty is leverage. Building on Kenneth Waltz’s insight about nuclear weapons, this piece argues that a state gains more from doubt about its cyber capabilities than from revealing their limits.
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Plan Red: Three Days to Paldiski
A scenario written from the Russian planner’s chair: how a short, sharp assault on the Baltics could unfold, and what it would take to deter it.
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Designer Satellite Collisions from Covert Cyber War
A hijacked satellite could be steered into a collision that looks like an accident. This 2012 paper examines covert cyber attacks on space assets and why active defense is needed.
-
NATO: The Growing Alliance and the Insider Risks
Insider threat is no longer only spies and sabotage. Any misalignment with the mission undermines it, and a growing alliance must plan for the half-hearted within.
-
After the War in Ukraine: Cyber Revanchism
When the war ends, Russia may strike back in cyberspace through criminal proxies, a face-saving way to get the last word. Western infrastructure should prepare for the cyber fallout.
-
European Open Data can be Weaponized
Open government data released for transparency can be combined into a detailed targeting picture. Innocent datasets, aggregated, become intelligence for an adversary.
-
Our Critical Infrastructure – Their Cyber Range
Not every attack on US critical infrastructure serves a grand strategy. Hostile regimes may simply be using American systems as a training range for their operators, and that changes how defenders should read the threat.
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If Communist China loses a future war, entropy could be imminent
What happens to the Chinese Communist Party’s grip on society if it starts a great power war and loses? The risk of internal collapse deserves more attention.
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What is the rationale behind election interference?
Everyone agrees election interference is serious, but less is said about why Russia does it. The answer lies in deepening divisions and eroding trust in society itself.
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Why Iran would avoid a major cyberwar
An authoritarian regime that survives by suppressing its people has the most to lose from strategic cyberwar. Iran would risk more than it could gain.