The Founding Fathers have done more for U.S. strategic cyber resiliency than other modern initiatives. Their contribution is a stable…
In my view, one of the major weaknesses in cyber defense planning is the perception that there is time to…
The demands for legalizing corporate hack backs are growing – and there is significant interest by private actors to utilize…
THE ZERO DOMAIN In the upcoming Fall 2018 issue of the Cyber Defense Review, I present a concept – the…
( I wrote this opinion piece together with Lt. Col. Stephen Hamilton and Capt. Kyle Hager) The U.S. Army’s ability to…
The change from a focus on counter-insurgency to near-peer and peer-conflicts has also introduced the likelihood, if there is a…
In the cyber debate, there is a significant, if not totally over-shadowing, focus on the information systems themselves – the…
In my view, one of the major weaknesses in cyber defense planning is the perception that there is time…
The rise of interest in artificial intelligence and machine learning has a flip side. It might not be so smart…
Spectrum sounds to many ears like old fashioned, Cold War jamming, crude brute electromagnetic overkill. In reality though, the…
Cyber operations are designed to be a tool for defense, security and war. In the same way as harmless computer…
During the last year several op-ed articles and commentaries have proposed that private companies should have the right to strike…
NDU Press just published: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1651760/chinas-strategic-support-force-a-force-for-a-new-era/ From the Executive Summary: “In late 2015, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) initiated reforms that…
I was interviewed this spring by The Hill regarding the cyber war in outer space.
Any future nation-state adversary surely understands the U.S. reliance on satellite communications for global military operations. Therefore, they likely understand there is a crude and unsophisticated way to disturb and degrade satellite communication, an IED of outer space that can be introduced, by polluting orbits with shrapnel and debris that are likely to damage any space-borne assets in their way. Essentially, an adversary can choose between two types of noncyber anti-satellite attacks: direct kinetic and indirect kinetic. While a direct kinetic anti-satellite missile attack on a U.S. satellite is possible, it would provide direct attribution to the attacker, thus leading to repercussions.
The thruster and the heat from a missile would be identified and attributed to the country or vessel that launched the attack. A direct kinetic attack might be inviting, but the political price is high. Even though it would be inviting to attack satellites, an adversary would not be able to attack without leaving a trace of tangible evidence. Using an ASAT missile is a grave act of war and can only reasonably be used if the perpetrator anticipates and accepts a wartime response.
For a potential adversary, it can be far more advantageous to increase the amount of debris that clutters specific orbits, thus epitomizing the indirect attack. Increasing debris can be accomplished through actively adding debris to specific well-targeted orbits, systematic designer accidents or collisions in space.